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Abstract:  With increasing grid computing application in more and more industries 
and sectors, grid security has grown into the most critical as well as important aspect 
in overall application architecture. This article, from architecture layer security 
dimension, studies security issue in grid computing environments, indicating 
architecture layer based security solutions in current grid computing and proposing 
grid security recommendations as well, which will contribute to further defining and 
analyzing security strategy in grid computing and function as a guideline to the 
development of grid computing technology. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Grid concept and technology were initially introduced by Foster and Kesselman in 1998(Ian Foster, Carl 
Kesselman, 1998). And in 2001, Foster, Kesselman, and Tuecke defined grid as “Coordinated Resource 
Sharing” that resolves issues in dynamic and multi-organizational virtual structures(Foster, Kesselman, 
Tuecke, 2001). From then on people conduct comprehensive theoretical research and specific practice on 
grid computing, drawing high attention from research institutions in plenty of counties and becoming a 
hot research subject in IT sector. 
Grid computing introduces coordinated and seamless resource sharing and computing issue. Through 
grids, grid computing integrates geographically scattered and systematically heterogeneous resources 
into a virtual “Supercomputer” (Foster, Kesselman. 2004) for largely scaled distributed and 
high-performance computing. Grid computing offers users huge computing capability by resource 
sharing and virtualization. It is right its tremendous application potential that IT makes enterprise 
associations hold greater expectation on grid computing as well. With its application popularization, 
however, researchers and IT enterprise associations start paying attention to the possible security issues 
from grid environments. Gird environments are based on the Internet, they therefore face security threats 
from various aspects, including external intrusions, internal attacks, and cross-domain call security 
issues, etc. Grid environment nature of heterogeneity, allocation on-demand, and distribution determines 
                                                        
1 National Nature Science Foundation of China (Approval Number: 60873235 and 60473099) and New 
Century Excellent Talents in University sponsored by Ministry of Education of China (Approval Number: 
NCET-06-0300) 
2  Male, Ph.D Candidate, College of Computer Science and Technology, Inner Mongolia University for the 
nationalities, Tongliao, 028043, China. 
﹡Received on February 22, 2010; accepted on May 6, 2010 
BAI Qing-hai/ Management Science and Engineering Vol.4 No.2 2010  
 
    109
that grid security covers wider area, involves more issues, and needs more complicated solutions, in 
addition to traditional security issues. 
This article analyzes the security issue in current grid environments, and further defines, analyzes, and 
clarifies security solutions in grid computing environments; and it is of important significance for the 
development and popularization of grid computing technology. 
 
2.  ARCHITECTURE LAYER BASED GRID COMPUTING 
SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS 
 
Study grid computing security issues from architecture prospect through analyzing security issues 
existing in architecture layer of current grid computing environments. 
 
2.1  Architecture level 
The security issues introduced by the architecture layer involve overall grid system, including 
information security, strategy mapping, and decline, etc. 
 
2.1.1  Information security 
The information security in grid system is briefly classified into: secure communications, authentication, 
single sign-on, and agent. 
 
2.1.1.1  Secure communications 
There currently have some primary security protocols been applied in grid environments, such as 
SSL/SSH, SET, and S/MIME, etc. 
In Globus system, SSL protocol is used to complete secure communications among GSI grid entities. 
In GT4, GSI supports the security in both transportation layer and session level as well3. To ensure 
transportation layer security, GSI applies SSL and X.509 credential among gird entities; to ensure 
session level security, GSI supports WS-Security specification and WS-SecureConversation one as well, 
which can provide SOAP security insurance on every session level. Since the secure work mode at 
session layer is to ensure the security of every single SOAP message, the work mode is able to conduct 
joint performance with transportation layer in any pattern and allows to impose security protections to 
various levels upon importance and sensitivity of data. 
The reason GT4 supports session level security is that it allows users to follow WS-Interoperability’s 
basic security profiles. GT4 services take transportation level security as default form based on user 
performance requirement consideration. 
The lower performance implementation in session layer is primarily caused by implementation and 
partially by specifications. With constant integration between Web service and grid computing, grid 
security has started gradually steering to application session layer security. If session layer security 
performance gains evident improvement, GT4 will expect to use session layer security as its default 
mode, transportation layer security support will be ultimately turned to less important. This change will 
happen after transition, however, instead of happening right now.4 
                                                        
3 http://www-unix.globus.org/toolkit/docs/4.0/security/message/ 
4 The Globus Security Team.Globus Toolkit Version 4 Grid Security Infrastructure: A Standards Perspective. 2005.7 
BAI Qing-hai/ Management Science and Engineering Vol.4 No.2 2010  
 
    110
It uses TLS or WS security, WS security session (session level), and SOAP all together as message 
protection mechanism, X.509 terminal entity credential or grid user name or password as authentication 
credential, X.509 agent credential or WS trust as entrust, and SAML declaration as authorization. 
 
2.1.1.2  Authentication 
Credential is an important aspect in GSI authentication. In grid environment, every user and gird service 
must be authenticated by credential. In traditional application systems, authentication is conducted 
through client identity verification to ensure server security. In grid computing environments, however, 
in addition to the client identity verification, it also needs to conduct server identity verification, since it 
is possible for some imposters to provide fake services to cheat user data. In order to share information 
with other public key based software, GSI credential as well takes X.509 credential format. 
If a user wants to apply a credential, he/she first needs to generate a pair of keys. The public key is 
placed in the application sent to CA authentication application, while the private one is saved in local 
computer in encryption pattern. If a user uses authentication credential, he/she must input password to 
open the encrypted file containing the private key. 
CA generally includes a Register Authority that needs to verify users’ credential applications, for 
instance, it will check if a user name is unique in CA and if it is user’s true name, etc. When RA 
verification is completed, CA will accordingly issue the authentication application and then send the 
applicant a credential. 
In GSI authentication, a core concept is credential. GSI identifies every user and service through 
credential that contains essential data to authenticate users and services. 
The associations between the public keys and the entities in credentials are proved by CA. To trust 
user credentials and their contents, grid system then must to trust the credentials issued by CA. 
GIS credential uses X.509 credential format to encrypt. X.509 credential is the most popular 
mechanism at present; GT4 also supports this authentication method in different levels. Although GSI 
X.509 credential is the proven secure solution in authentications, it must need PKI. This type of 
authentication mechanism has its limitations: complicated credential management institution, high 
maintenance costs, low operational efficiency, limited user administration scale, and requirement to keep 
CA online operation, etc. 
Another issue is it needs to consider the interoperability with other authentication mechanisms, the 
interoperability with Kerberos for example. There is a method to combine GSI with kerberos, or use 
KX.509/KCA5 (Kerberos-nized CA) as the gateway from GSI to Kerberos and SSL K5/PKIMT from 
Kerberos to GSI. 
(3) Single Sign-on and agent 
In traditional network application, security authentication is implemented through 
username/password. Various systems have their own security strategies however; users need to conduct 
identity authentications required by all corresponding systems before using them, users therefore have to 
member various usernames and passwords corresponding to different application systems, making it 
inconvenient for users. In addition, usernames/passwords are transmitted online and vulnerable to 
hacker attacks. 
In view of this, GSI conducts function extension on SSL, making it have security entrust capability to 
reduce the number for users to input their passwords. If a grid task needs to use multiple grid resources or 
requests resources on users’ behalf, GSI then can set an agent to avoid constant password input. 
A user agent is composed of a new credential containing the identity of its owner. And the new 
credential is issued by user instead of CA. The credential contains both public and private keys, user 
                                                        
5 http://blog.donews.com/movele/archive/2006/03/07/756298.aspx 
BAI Qing-hai/ Management Science and Engineering Vol.4 No.2 2010  
 
    111
identifier, agent identifier, and a counter indicating the time limit of the agent validity. 
It is requested to ensure the security of agent private key. Due to agent time limitation however, it is 
not requested the absolute security that requested in user private keys. There is a processing method 
which is to save agent private key into a file in local machine without private key encryption. However it 
still needs to set file access permission for it to prevent it from being caught easily. 
Once system creates and saves agent, users then can use agent credential and private key to mutually 
identify and password is not needed anymore. There is a slight difference in mutual identifying while 
user is using agent authentication. Remote resources also receive user credential in addition to agent 
credential. In the mutual identifying process, system uses user public key to prove the signature validity 
of agent credential and then uses CA public key to prove signature validity of user credential, actually 
creating a trust chain from CA to agent via user. Through the trust chain, the programs using the agent 
can run as local user programs during agent credential validity period. GSI can use both SAML and 
XACML to define fine-grained trust strategy descriptions. 
SAML (T.Moses, ed.) (Security Assertion Markup Language) is OASIS-recommended security 
service standard and primarily used in secure data exchange between mutually trusted partners. It is 
based on XML architecture and the main protocol of federated identity authentications; it can issue a 
valid user identity authentication and authorization in a secure area. And standard data format supports 
cross-domain data exchange. 
XACML(Keahey, Welch, 2002) (eXtensible Access control Markup Language) is ISO-formulated 
security strategy standard, provides uniform strategy description language, and improves coordinated 
performance capability among different organizations in WEB environment. Its owns flexibility, fits in 
various environments, supports data types, functions, and combinational logic, and offers high strategy 
expression ability, making it possible for users to define various complicated or simple rules and 
describe fine-grained access control needs. 
Although GSI, to some extent, resolves some issues including identity authentication, single sign-on, 
and secure communications, etc; there are still some existing issues such as identity authentication 
performance, GSI identity mapping model, agent credential management, trust management service 
perfection, and security management costs, etc. 
 
2.1.2  Strategy mapping issue 
To implement gird computing resource access, a user must be authorized after authentication before 
effectively accessing resource. And grid resources can’t be reasonably applied without correct, 
reasonable, and flexible authorization (Keahey, Weleh, et al., 2003).  
Virtual organization refers to the wide area virtual organization that gathers distributed users and 
resource providers with various security strategies and cross different management domains. Virtual 
organization aims at providing authorization mechanism and defining security authorization strategies. 
In addition to the special security strategies from virtual organization, there are also existing local 
security policies in local sites. Managing these strategies is therefore the major concern. It can classify 
the solutions to solve this issue into two types: resource layer issue and VO layer issue. Akenti-provided 
authorization mechanism is on the resource layer while CAS and VOMS-provided access control 
mechanism is on the VO layer. 
 
2.1.2.1  Resource layer 
After setting up a trust relationship with enterprise associations, resource provider authorizes them some 
access privileges. When users expect to access resources, enterprise associations issue certificate, 
including special policy assertion in virtual organizations. Resource provider decides to allow or decline 
the access request according to policy assertion and local authorized policy information. 
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Akenti (ThomPson, Essiari, Mudumbai, 2003;Thompson, Johnston, et al, 1999) is the product 
developed by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, used to authorize management mechanism in 
GSI architecture. In Akenti authorization system, users access resources must go through resource 
gateway of each resource, otherwise access can be declined. Users connect resource gateway with SSL, 
using individual user credential for identity authentication. Resource administrator controls the access 
by using created credential which saved the requirements of the resource access. Clients request for 
accessing the resources to resource gateway, resource gateway submits authorization application to 
Akenti server, Akenti sever controls access through simple ACL, or through attribute credential. If it 
uses attribute credential, Akenti server need to access policy credential to get access requirements 
credential, and if there is policy information not allowed to access, the grid resource access can be 
declined; otherwise allow the access. 
 
2.1.2.2  VO layer 
The purpose of virtual organization is to control access towards different users belong to a specific 
association. The association can be granted access based on some information, such as roles, 
membership authentication, etc. The typical example is CAS and VOMS. 
CAS (Community Authorization Server)(Park, et al, 2008) is an access mechanism developed by 
Globus community with purpose is to maintain access control of scalability and fine-grained in the grid 
environments when visiting the authorized organizations inside VO system. 
Under the condition of multi-organization operations, establishment of trust relationship is difficult 
and complicated as well; CAS will provide uniform administration in the way of a centralized 
authentication service. Resource provider issues access to a global account in VO organizations and 
CAS server provides access control to all entities in the domain. Grid user applies access to CAS, 
providing user credential. After CAS server authentication, through access policy database in CAS, it 
decides if the access will be allowed or declined. If the access is allowed, CAS server creates a credential 
authorization, and the user uses it to apply for certain computing resources. A series of authentication is 
made by resource provider and to decide whether this access will be allowed. 
Data Grid and ataTAG (Alfieri ,et al, 2005) in Europe are similar to CAS in the architecture, they both 
create policy credential statement from service center to grid users, then the users get access from virtual 
organizations. The primary difference is that they operate with different levels of authorization, CAS 
policy statement contains a direct user privilege which does not need the resources to further explain; in 
the policy statement of VOMS, it contains the list of a role or association members, grid user passes 
through the association relationship policy statement to resource owner, resource owner calls up the 
function of authorization policy decision based on local policy to decide which privilege should be 
granted to user. 
CAS and VOMS mentioned above are based on virtual organization and give better solution and make 
up the drawbacks of traditional GSI. However, they have disadvantages, for instance: 
①A single policy server in a virtual organization, bottleneck and reliability can be occurred during 
user access. 
②There is no feedback mechanism in CAS, introducing negative effects during certain resource 
allocations. 
③ Policy statement need to be further standardized. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
will become standardized language by international organizations. 
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2.1.3  Denial of service 
2.1.3.1  Preventive Solution 
It is divided into application filtering and intrusion detection systems. Application filtering probably 
occurs in XML layer; it monitors SOAP message through firewall. In application layer, new generation 
firewall can filter most of common DOS based on XML. There is an alternative that it uses intrusion 
detection system, such as IDS (Grid-based IDS system), similar to Snort system, and SANTA-G, etc. 
 
2.1.3.2  Reactive techniques 
It can be divided into link testing and logging. The fundamental principle of link testing is to find the 
attackers against traffic flow. However, the implementation of this technique has many difficulties, not 
only technical but also administrative and political, etc. Logging is to track the attacker according to data 
package logged in the router. However, the problem is that most of resources are requested to carry 
log-based identity authentication, and it is not easy to identify the attackers. 
The attention on the attack of distributed denial of service has been paid more and more in recent years 
(Stallings, Meng, 2009). In a typical DDOS attack, a huge number of controlled hosts are used to send 
useless packages, preventing user from normal services. Recently, the model and tools of DDOS attack 
are becoming more and more complicated and efficient, making it hard to track real attackers. And the 
existing defense technologies are not powerful enough to resist large-scaled attacks(Chang, 2002). 
During DDOS attack, an attacker initially infects a large number of hosts, so that they become zombie 
hosts and perform attack mission. The attack process is as following: the attacker designs the software to 
perform DDOS attack and hide himself; on the other hand, most of hosts have security vulnerabilities so 
that the attacker can install zombie software; they use scanning technique to search for vulnerable hosts. 
The process above has been repeated until a distributed network with a large number of zombie hosts is 
established. 
There are briefly three ways against DDOS as following: 
The early warning mechanisms before attacks, detecting and filtering mechanisms during attack, and 
attack source tracing and identifying mechanisms after attacks. 
 
3.  SUMMARY 
 
The architecture layer proposes the security issues involving grid architecture. Due to the heterogeneous 
nature of the grid and the character that it allows virtualization in user layer, users need to consider how 
to map different security policies to pass through cross-domain grid, this mapping strategy is particularly 
important. Other security issues include attack of distributed denial of service in the grid and information 
security, such as data confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, etc. And all security issues mentioned 
are classified into this layer. 
In grid computing environments, the final goal of grid security issue is to prevent grid infrastructure 
from known and unknown attacks. We cannot establish a once and for all grid security solution, because 
the attackers constantly search security vulnerabilities which include system itself, or the protocols we 
rely on. Therefore, the practical solution is to develop continuously, and update all solutions proposed in 
this article. In connection with specific security policies, whether in quality or quantity it must develop 
robustness security tools. 
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